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Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale

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  • Guoqiang Tian

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  • Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:14:y:2010:i:1:p:163-184
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0088-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cornet, B., 1984. "Existence of equilibria in economies with increasing returns," CORE Discussion Papers 1984007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
    3. Cornet, Bernard, 1988. "General equilibrium theory and increasing returns : Presentation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 103-118, April.
    4. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    5. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
    6. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Cornet, Bernard, 1988. "Existence of equilibria when firms follow bounded losses pricing rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 119-147, April.
    7. Luca Anderlini & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 413-447, April.
    8. CORNET, Bernard, 1988. "Marginal cost pricing and Pareto optimality," CORE Discussion Papers 1988037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. John Duggan, 2003. "Nash implementation with a private good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 117-131, January.
    10. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    11. Brown, Donald J. & Heller, Walter P. & Starr, Ross M., 1992. "Two-part marginal cost pricing equilibria: Existence and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 52-72.
    12. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
    13. Guoqiang Tian, 1989. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 613-621.
    14. Stefan Reichelstein & Stanley Reiter, 1985. "Game Forms with Minimal Strategy Spaces," Discussion Papers 663, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Well-behaved mechanism; Implementation; Marginal cost pricing equilibrium with transfers; Increasing returns; Non-convexities; C72; D61; D71; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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