Nash implementation with a Private Good
I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy, and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable) good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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