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Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution

Author

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  • Luca Anderlini
  • Paolo Siconolfi

Abstract

We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Pareto-efficient allocation to be implemented. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of Lindahl prices is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium, and implements the corresponding Lindahl allocation. Finally, besides being balanced, our mechanism is ‘simple’. Each agent has to declare a desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers of initial endowments (across other agents). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Anderlini & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 413-447, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:413-447
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-004-0113-7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    2. Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth D. Myles, 2009. "Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 565-598, August.
    3. Guoqiang Tian, 2010. "Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 163-184, March.

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