Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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- Semin Kim, 2016. "Incentive Compatibility On The Domain Of Singlepeaked Preferences," Working papers 2016rwp-96, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
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- Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
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