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Takashi Kunimoto

Personal Details

First Name:Takashi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kunimoto
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pku105
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/tkunimoto73/
Terminal Degree:2005 Economics Department; Brown University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics
Singapore Management University

Singapore, Singapore
http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/

: 65-6828 0832
65-6828 0833
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903
RePEc:edi:sesmusg (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics," TSE Working Papers 18-942, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2018. "On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2018, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  3. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions," Working Papers 2010-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  8. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  10. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "On The Non-Robustness Of Nash Implementation," Departmental Working Papers 2006-25, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  11. Takashi Kunimoto, 2006. "The Robustness Of Equilibrium Analysis: The Case Of Undominated Nash Equilibrium," Departmental Working Papers 2006-26, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  12. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2019. "Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 247-263.
  2. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  3. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
  5. Takashi Kunimoto, 2010. "Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 271-289, September.
  6. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2008. "Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 367-370, May.
  7. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Bargaining and competition revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, revised Apr 2019.

  2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    5. Safronov, Mikhail, 2018. "Coalition-proof full efficient implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 659-677.

  3. Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Prof Matthias Lang, 2014. "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4830, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Oliver Hart, 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-20, August.
    3. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux & Richard Holden, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00943301, HAL.
    4. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
    5. n/a, 2012. "Commentaries and Reply to "Can Brand Extension Signal Product Quality?" by Sridhar Moorthy," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 771-778, September.
    6. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
    7. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2008. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Discussion Papers 2008/23, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    8. Berde, Éva, 2013. "A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében
      [The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 865-885.
    9. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2015. "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 11002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 19, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 181-197, Spring.
    12. Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," IZA Discussion Papers 8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Thomas F. Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2012. "A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement," NBER Working Papers 18495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    15. Eccles, Peter & Wegner, Nora, 2016. "Robustness of subgame perfect implementation," Bank of England working papers 601, Bank of England.
    16. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 544-564.
    17. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    18. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    19. Guembel, Alexander & White, Lucy, 2014. "Good cop, bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 541-569.
    20. Hart, Oliver D., 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points," Scholarly Articles 29058539, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    21. Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Full implementation in backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-76.
    22. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    23. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Locally robust contracts for moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 36-51.
    24. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    25. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  4. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design," Working Papers 2010-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.

  5. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    2. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, revised Apr 2019.
    3. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.
    4. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo & Chen Qu, 2016. "Rationalizability in general situations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 147-167, January.
    5. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

  6. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
    5. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    6. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
    7. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2011. "A robustness result for rationalizable implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 301-305, May.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
    9. Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
    10. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

  7. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Korth & Stefan Napel, 2009. "Fairness, Price Stickiness, and History Dependence in Decentralized Trade," Post-Print hal-00682404, HAL.
    2. DAVILA, Julio & EECKHOUT, Jan, 2009. "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Régis Breton, 2006. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Post-Print halshs-00256847, HAL.
    4. Flåm, S.D. & Godal, O., 2008. "Market clearing and price formation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 956-977, March.
    5. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
    6. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
    7. Penta, Antonio, 2007. "Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007.
    8. Lauermann, Stephan, 2011. "Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach," MPRA Paper 31717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Franco DONZELLI, 2011. "The law of indifference, equilibrium, and equilibration in Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth, and Negishi," Departmental Working Papers 2011-11, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Antoine Mandel & Herbert Gintis, 2016. "Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01296646, HAL.
    11. Penta, Antonio, 2011. "Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 417-424.
    12. Marakulin Valery, 2006. "On convergence of contractual trajectories in pure exchange economies," EERC Working Paper Series 06-07e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.

Articles

  1. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
    2. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    3. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Statistical utilitarianism," MPRA Paper 49561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    6. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    7. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.

  2. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Takashi Kunimoto, 2010. "Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 271-289, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2008. "Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 367-370, May.

  5. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Bargaining and competition revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2006-09-30 2007-06-23 2007-07-27 2010-01-30 2010-04-11 2010-05-08 2015-04-25 2018-08-27 2018-12-10. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2010-05-08 2015-04-25 2016-06-25 2018-08-27 2018-12-10. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2010-04-11
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2018-12-10
  5. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2016-06-25
  6. NEP-SEA: South East Asia (1) 2018-12-10

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