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On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity

Author

Listed:
  • Ritesh Jain
  • Michele Lombardi

Abstract

Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Bergemann and Morris (2008a) and Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim rationalizable strategies by a mechanism that has a pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium

Suggested Citation

  • Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2023. "On Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity," Working Papers 202315, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:liv:livedp:202315
    as

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    File URL: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolofmanagement/docs/ECON,WP,202315,full.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2022
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2019. "Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 247-263.
    3. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    4. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    5. R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    6. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran, 2020. "Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 10-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Arieli, Itai, 2010. "Rationalizability in continuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 912-924, September.
    8. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
    9. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jain, Ritesh & Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2025. "Two-player rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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