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Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization

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Abstract

Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity, due to Oury and Tercieux (2012), fully characterizes the class of social choice functions that are implementable in interim correlated rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash equilibrium) strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritesh Jain and & Michele Lombardi, 2022. "Interim Rationalizable (and Bayes-Nash) Implementation of Functions: A full Characterization," CSEF Working Papers 645, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:645
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Continuous Implementation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754580, HAL.
    2. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Continuous Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1605-1637, July.
    3. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    4. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. R Jain & V Korpela & M Lombardi, 2021. "An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 21-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    6. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
    7. Arieli, Itai, 2010. "Rationalizability in continuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 912-924, September.
    8. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754580 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, December.
    10. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    temporary contracts; young workers; flexibility; institutional reforms; employment protection legislation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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