IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/smuesw/2020_010.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Kunimoto, Takashi

    () (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

  • Saran, Rene

    () (University of Cincinnati)

Abstract

A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strate-gies if every rationalizable strategy profile on every type space results in outcomes consistent with it. First, we establish an equivalence between robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and “weak rationalizable implementation”. Second, using the equivalence result, we identify weak robust monotonicity as a necessary and al-most sufficient condition for robust implementation in rationalizable strategies. This exhibits a contrast with robust implementation in interim equilibria, i.e., every equilib-rium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with the SCF. Bergemann and Morris (2011) show that strict robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for robust implementation in interim equilibria. We argue that strict robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than weak robust monotonicity, which further implies that, within general mechanisms, robust implementation in rationalizable strategies is more permissive than robust implementation in interim equilibria. The gap between robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and that in interim equilibria stems from the strictly stronger nonemptiness requirement inherent in the latter concept.

Suggested Citation

  • Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene, 2020. "Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 10-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:smuesw:2020_010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2373/
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ex post incentive compatibility; rationalizability; interim equilibrium; robust implementation; weak rationalizable implementation; weak robust monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:smuesw:2020_010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Cheong Pei Qi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sesmusg.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.