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Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Characterization

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  • Siyang Xiong

Abstract

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Characterization," Papers 2202.04885, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2202.04885
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Rationalizable Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 11, pages 375-404, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 4, pages 153-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
    5. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
    6. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1326-1344, November.
    7. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    9. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jain, Ritesh & Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2025. "Two-player rationalizable implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    2. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2025. "Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 07-2026, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    3. Chatterji, Shurojit & Kunimoto, Takashi & Ramos, Paulo, 2026. "Compellingness in Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 35-62.
    4. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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