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A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms

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  • Debasis Mishra

Abstract

We study deterministic voting mechanisms by considering an ordinal notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). If the beliefs of agents are independent and generic, we show that any OBIC mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible under an additional mild requirement. Our result works in a large class of preference domains (that include the unrestricted domain, the single peaked domain, a specific class of single crossing domains) and under a weaker notion of OBIC that we call locally OBIC. We also discuss the implications of assuming unanimity on our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Debasis Mishra, 2014. "A Foundation for Dominant Strategy Voting Mechanisms," ISER Discussion Paper 0916, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0916
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    File URL: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2014/DP0916.pdf
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    1. Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching," Working Papers hal-00242988, HAL.
    2. Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    3. Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
    4. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    5. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, March.
    6. Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
    7. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
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