Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem
In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilib- rium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibrium where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we re- late equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL|
Web page: https://aquila1.iseg.ulisboa.pt/aquila/departamentos/EC
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