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Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching

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Abstract

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2003. "Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 582.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:582.03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, May.
    2. Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116, January.
    3. Jinpeng Ma, 1996. "On randomized matching mechanisms (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 377-381.
    4. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
    5. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2005. "Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 305-324, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2009. "Employment By Lotto Revisited," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 181-198.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2007. "Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 411-416, August.
    3. Karla Atkins & Achla Marathe & Chris Barrett, 2007. "A computational approach to modeling commodity markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 125-142, September.
    4. Sebastian Montaño Correa, 2015. "Compulsory Social Service Matching Market for Physicians in Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 012856, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    5. Elette Boyle & Federico Echenique, 2009. "Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 87-99, June.
    6. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Median Stable Matching for College Admissions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 1-11, April.
    7. Thayer Morrill, 2013. "An alternative characterization of top trading cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 181-197, September.
    8. Aziz, Haris & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2013. "The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 341-345.
    9. Thayer Morrill, 2015. "Two simple variations of top trading cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 123-140, September.
    10. Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    procedural fairness; random mechanism; stability; two-sided matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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