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Employment by Lotto Revisited

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Abstract

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Employment by Lotto Revisited," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 627.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 17 Jan 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:627.04
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    1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Procedurally fair and stable matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 431-447, January.
    2. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment by lotto; random mechanism; two-sided matching; stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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