IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Decentralizing university admission: Evidence from a natural experiment

  • Horstschräer, Julia

Applying a differences-in-differences strategy, I study the decentralization of university admission as a natural experiment. Is the centralized or decentralized procedure better suited to match prospective students to universities? The analysis uses administrative data on all students within Germany and complements the prominent theoretical literature on college admission. The results show that the matching efficiency increased in course of the decentralization. This increase is mainly driven by enabling law schools to abolish admission restrictions. The matching quality is not significantly affected by the decentralization process but suggests that abolishing admission restrictions could be associated with increasing drop-out rates.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/67068/1/730650758.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 12-076.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12076
Contact details of provider: Postal: L 7,1; D - 68161 Mannheim
Phone: +49/621/1235-01
Fax: +49/621/1235-224
Web page: http://www.zew.de/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  2. Braun Sebastian & Dwenger Nadja & Kübler Dorothea, 2010. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, March.
  3. Joana Pais, 2006. "Random Matching in the College Admissions Problem," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/13, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  4. Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-70, May.
  5. Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Course Bidding at Business Schools," Game Theory and Information 0306001, EconWPA, revised 02 Jan 2004.
  6. Horstschräer, Julia & Sprietsma, Maresa, 2010. "The effects of the bologna process on college enrollment and drop-out rates," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-018, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  7. Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 759, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Median Stable Matching for College Admission," Working Papers 165, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," CEP Discussion Papers dp0470, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
  11. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2005. "Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 153-158, February.
  12. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2011. "Equilibrium in the Labor Market with Search Frictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1092-1105, June.
  13. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  14. Dwenger, Nadja & Storck, Johanna & Wrohlich, Katharina, 2012. "Do tuition fees affect the mobility of university applicants? Evidence from a natural experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 155-167.
  15. Pais, Joana, 2008. "Incentives in decentralized random matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
  16. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Decentralised Job Matching," Working Papers 2003.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  17. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  18. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June.
  19. Fahr, René & Sunde, Uwe, 2009. "Did the Hartz Reforms Speed-Up the Matching Process? A Macro-Evaluation Using Empirical Matching Functions," Munich Reprints in Economics 20482, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  20. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  21. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
  22. Horstschräer, Julia, 2011. "University rankings in action? The importance of rankings and an excellence competition for university choice of high-ability students?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-061, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12076. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.