On take it or leave it offers in common agency
If the agent’s preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs, 2003.
"Common agency games with separable preferences,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Attar Andrea & Gwen�el Piaser & Nicolas Porteiro, 2006. "Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences," Working Papers 2006_28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-190, May.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Discussion Papers 1458, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2008. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 85, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Peters, Michael, 2007. "Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 594-595, July.
- Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
- Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2010. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 21-33, September.
- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, "undated". "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2238, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Claude, D’ASPREMONT & Rodolphe, DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, 2005. "Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- D’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2005. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:777-781. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.