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On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency

  • Seungjin Han

If the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.

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Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-04.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision: Jun 2012
Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2010-04
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  1. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
  2. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, . "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2238, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-90, May.
  4. Peters, Michael, 2007. "Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 594-595, July.
  5. ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolà s, 2003. "Common agency games with separable preferences," CORE Discussion Papers 2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
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