On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency
If the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2010|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2012|
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- Michael Peters, 1999.
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- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Discussion Papers 1458, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010.
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- d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2010.
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- Claude, Dâ€™ASPREMONT & Rodolphe, DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, 2005. "Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Dâ€™ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2005. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," CORE Discussion Papers 2005018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peters, Michael, 2007. "Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 594-595, July.
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