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Delegation in Veto Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Navin Kartik
  • Andreas Kleiner
  • Richard Van Weelden

Abstract

A proposer requires a veto player's approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including "full delegation": Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer's ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned.

Suggested Citation

  • Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner & Richard Van Weelden, 2021. "Delegation in Veto Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(12), pages 4046-4087, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:12:p:4046-87
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201817
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    Cited by:

    1. Keister, Todd & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2023. "Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    2. S. Nageeb Ali & Andreas Kleiner & Kun Zhang, 2024. "From Design to Disclosure," Papers 2411.03608, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    3. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    4. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2023. "Countervailing Conflicts of Interest in Delegation Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-20, November.
    5. Hu, Xiaoxiao & Lei, Haoran, 2025. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 215-234.
    6. Andreas Kleiner, 2022. "Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World," Papers 2208.11835, arXiv.org.
    7. Patrick Lahr & Axel Niemeyer, 2024. "Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening," Papers 2412.00649, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    8. S. Nageeb Ali & Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner, 2023. "Sequential Veto Bargaining With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1527-1562, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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