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A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection


  • Carlier, Guillaume


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  • Carlier, Guillaume, 2001. "A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:35:y:2001:i:1:p:129-150

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lollivier, Stefan & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1983. "Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 392-400, December.
    2. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    3. Levin, Vladimir L., 1997. "Reduced cost functions and their applications," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 155-186, September.
    4. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 473-502, November.
    5. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
    6. Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. "Optimal tax theory : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-358, November.
    7. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
    8. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Alexander Konovalov, 2014. "Too much or too little? Price-discrimination in a market for credence goods," Working Papers 2014-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game," MPRA Paper 80870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
    4. Noldeke, Georg & Larry Samuelson, 2015. "The Implementation Duality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1993R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
    5. Gustavo Ferro & Omar Chisari, 2010. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," Working Papers hal-00473038, HAL.
    6. Ludovic Renou, 2003. "A Didactic Example of Linear (Multidimensional) Screening Contracts," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(3), pages 245-261, December.
    7. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," Caepr Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13348 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. Noldeke, Georg & Larry Samuelson, 2015. "The Implementation Duality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1993, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    11. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 753-772.
    12. Kelvin Shuangjian Zhang, 2017. "Existence in Multidimensional Screening with General Nonlinear Preferences," Papers 1710.08549,
    13. Frederic Cherbonnier, 2016. "optimal insurance for time-inconsistent agents," 2016 Meeting Papers 1344, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Pass, Brendan, 2012. "Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2399-2418.
    15. Suren Basov & Svetlana Danilkina, 2010. "Multitasking, Multidimensional Screening, and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(s1), pages 80-86, September.
    16. Pierre-Andr'e Chiappori & Robert McCann & Brendan Pass, 2016. "Multidimensional matching," Papers 1604.05771,
    17. Fausto Gozzi, 2012. "Mathematical Tools for Economic Dynamics: Dynamic Optimization," Discussion Papers 19_2012, CRISEI, University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy.
    18. Ivar Ekeland, 2010. "Notes on optimal transportation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(2), pages 437-459, February.
    19. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2016. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games," Working Papers 1618E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    20. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Suren Basov, 2002. "A Partial Characterization of the Solution of the Multidimensional Screening Problem with Nonlinear Preferences," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 860, The University of Melbourne.
    22. Cl'emence Alasseur & Ivar Ekeland & Romuald Elie & Nicol'as Hern'andez Santib'a~nez & Dylan Possamai, 2017. "An adverse selection approach to power pricing," Papers 1706.01934,
    23. Alejandro Francetich, 2015. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 45-76, May.

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