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Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard

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  • Page, Frank H, Jr

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  • Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 265-281, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:2:p:265-81
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    Cited by:

    1. Page Jr., Frank H., 2008. "Catalog competition and stable nonlinear prices," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 822-835, July.
    2. Marcus Berliant & Frank H. Page, 2006. "Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(3), pages 409-451, August.
    3. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," CAEPR Working Papers 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    4. Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," CAEPR Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    5. Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
    6. Gong, Rui & He, Jieshuang & Page, Frank, 2016. "Incentive compatible networks and the delegated networking principle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Yu Chen, 2019. "Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 277-290, December.
    9. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 473-502, November.
    10. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2020. "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(4), pages 1023-1047, June.
    11. Yu Chen, 2013. "Bilateral Mechanism Design: Practical Contracting in Multi-Agency," CAEPR Working Papers 2013-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    12. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
    13. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Non-linear pricing with a general cost function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 287-291, September.
    14. Fu, Jing & Page, Frank & Zigrand, Jean-Pierre, 2022. "Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118874, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023. "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 375-416, August.
    16. Dong Li & Nishant Mishra & Serguei Netessine, 2023. "Contracting for Product Support Under Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4627-4645, August.
    17. PAGE, Frank, 2000. "Competitive selling mechanisms: the delegation principle and farsighted stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
    19. Jing Fu & Frank Page & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 2023. "Correction to: Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 669-704, June.
    20. Julio Cezar Russo & Marco Antonio Guimarães Dias & André Barreira da Silva Rocha & Fernando Luiz Cyrino Oliveira, 2018. "Renegotiation in Public–Private Partnerships: An Incentive Mechanism Approach," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(6), pages 949-979, December.
    21. Jing Fu & Frank Page & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 2023. "Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 636-668, June.
    22. , & ,, 2012. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    23. Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March.
    24. Daniel Krv{s}ek & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Randomisation with moral hazard: a path to existence of optimal contracts," Papers 2311.13278, arXiv.org.

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