Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard
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Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Yu Chen, 2013. "Bilateral Mechanism Design: Practical Contracting in Multi-Agency," Caepr Working Papers 2013-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Page Jr., Frank H., 2008. "Catalog competition and stable nonlinear prices," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 822-835, July.
- Marcus Berliant & Frank H. Page, 2006.
"Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation,"
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- Berliant, Marcus & Page Jr., Frank H., 2003. "Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 1164, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Marcus Berliant & Frank H. Page Jr., 2004. "Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation," Public Economics 0407016, EconWPA.
- Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
- Frank Page & Paulo Monteiro, 2001. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(11), pages 1.
- Page, F.H.Jr. & Monteiro, P.K., 2001. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 592, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Frank H. Page & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2002. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Game Theory and Information 0204001, EconWPA.
- Page Junior, Frank H. & Monteiro, P. K., 2002. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 442, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Non-linear pricing with a general cost function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 287-291, September.
- Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu, 2012. "Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium," Caepr Working Papers 2012-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 473-502, November.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Frank H. Page Jr., 1996. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms for Multiproduct Monopolists: Incentive Compatibility in the Presence of Budget Constraints," Microeconomics 9610002, EconWPA.
- KLINGER MONTEIRO , Paulo & PAGE, Frank H. Jr., 1997. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists : incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," CORE Discussion Papers 1997011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- PAGE, Frank, 2000. "Competitive selling mechanisms: the delegation principle and farsighted stability," CORE Discussion Papers 2000021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rui Gong & Jieshuang He & Frank Page, 2016. "Incentive compatible networks and the delegated networking principle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:inu:caeprp:2012-008 is not listed on IDEAS
- Schlee, Edward & Chade, Hector, 2012. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Hector Chade & Edward Schlee, 2008. "Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002175, David K. Levine.
- Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March.
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