Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0196-1
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References listed on IDEAS
- Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Philip J. Reny, 2016.
"Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games,"
Economic Theory,
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 553-569, March.
- Philip J. Reny, 2013. "Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Working Papers 2013-004, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Common Agency Games with Common Value Exclusion, Convexity and Existence," Working Papers 2014-420, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
- Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, José, 2009.
"Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 749-760, July.
- Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, Jose, 2006. "Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp490, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Guilherme Carmona & José Fajardo, 2006. "Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection," IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers 2006-05, Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro.
- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Lafay, Thierry, 2010.
"Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 61-68, July.
- Pierre Fleckinger & Thierry Lafay, 2010. "Product flexibility and price competition in Hotelling's duopoly," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00641873, HAL.
- Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "On Discontinuous Games with Asymmetric Information," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1318, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
- Laurence Ales, 2009.
"Adverse Selection and Non-exclusive Contracts,"
2009 Meeting Papers
854, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero, 2009. "Adverse Selection and Non-Exclusive Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E61, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Rabia Nessah, 2013. "Weakly Continuous Security in Discontinuous and Nonquasiconcave Games: Existence and Characterization," Working Papers 2013-ECO-20, IESEG School of Management.
- Ulrich Horst & Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, 2010.
"Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design,"
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
SFB649DP2010-035, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Ulrich Horst & Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, 2011. "Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design," Papers 1107.0839, arXiv.org.
- He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2015. "Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 26-35.
- Galperti, Simone, 2015.
"Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
- Simone Galperti, 2011. "Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals," Discussion Papers 1541, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
More about this item
Keywords
Competitive nonlinear pricing games; Discontinuous games; Existence of Nash equilibrium; Competitive contracting; Uniform payoff security; Reciprocal upper semicontinuity; Better-reply security; C6; C7; D4;JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
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