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Pork-barrel politics, discriminatory policies and fiscal federalism
[Kuhhandel in der Lokalpolitik und der fiskalische Föderalismus]

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  • Roberson, Brian

Abstract

This paper examines the role of discriminatory policy tools in a model of redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific projects. In equilibrium, the ability to tactically target both jurisdictional specific projects, with benefits concentrated within a given jurisdiction, and the costs associated with those projects across multiple jurisdictions, leads to inefficiency in the provision of the “local” projects. In particular, politically motivated discrimination in the provision of local projects and/or their associated costs results in the foregoing of efficient projects. However, greater discriminatory ability in the set of available policies lowers the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberson, Brian, 2006. "Pork-barrel politics, discriminatory policies and fiscal federalism
    [Kuhhandel in der Lokalpolitik und der fiskalische Föderalismus]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-15, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200615
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
    3. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    4. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
    5. A. Lizzeri & Persico N., 1999. "Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electral Incentives," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f4, Economics Department, Princeton University.
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