Genericity of Minority Governments : The Role of Policy and Office
We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when office utility from cabinet positions is small relative to political disagreement. The result holds for policy spaces of arbitrary finite dimension and a general class of preferences over the government agreements space.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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