On the optimality of bargaining outcomes in the Collective-Particularistic multilateral bargaining game
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- Paul W. Rhode & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Koleman Strumpf, 2017. "The Arsenal of Democracy: Production and Politics During WWII," NBER Working Papers 24158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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KeywordsNon-cooperative bargaining; sequential negotiantion; voting; quota rules;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-02 (Microeconomics)
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