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Informational loss in bundled bargaining

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  • Ying Chen

    (Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA)

  • Hülya Eraslan

    (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA)

Abstract

We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority-rule voting determines the outcome. We compare the outcome of the ‘bundled bargaining’ game in which the legislators negotiate over both issues together to that of the ‘separate bargaining’ game in which the legislators negotiate over the issues one at a time. Although bundled bargaining allows the proposer to use transfers as an instrument for compromise on the ideological issue, we identify two disadvantages of bundled bargaining under asymmetric information: (i) ‘risk of losing the surplus’ (failure to reach agreement on ideology results in the dissipation of the surplus under bundled bargaining, but not under separate bargaining); (ii) ‘informational loss’ (the legislators may convey less information in the bundled bargaining game). Even when there is no risk of losing the surplus, the informational loss from bundling can be sufficiently large that it makes the proposer worse off.

Suggested Citation

  • Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:3:p:338-362
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813482232
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    3. Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0708, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
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    7. Lee, Barton E., 2022. "Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    8. Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2023. "Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation And Obstruction," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 757-781, May.
    9. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2017. "Dynamic Agenda Setting," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-32, May.
    10. Alan E Wiseman, 2013. "Information and political institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 301-308, July.
    11. Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
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