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Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Pradeep Dubey

    (Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820 and Indian Statistical Institute, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India)

Abstract

It is shown that Nash Equilibria of smooth games generally tend to be inefficient in the Pareto sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Pradeep Dubey, 1986. "Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:11:y:1986:i:1:p:1-8
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.1.1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 309-329, June.
    2. repec:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:7-:d:131464 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March.
    4. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Bilateral commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1817-1831, July.
    5. Munro, Alistair & Kebede, Bereket & Tarazona-Gomez, Marcela & Verschoor, Arjan, 2014. "Autonomy and efficiency. An experiment on household decisions in two regions of India," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 114-133.
    6. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Rogawski, J. & Shubik, M., 1986. "A strategic market game with transactions costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 139-160, April.
    9. Alistair Munro & Bereket Kebede & Marcela Tarazona-Gomez & Arjan Verschoor, 2011. "Autonomy or efficiency: An experiment on household decisions in two regions of India," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 11-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2016. "Random extensive form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 517-535.
    11. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Bilateral commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1817-1831, July.

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