A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games
We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateralbargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are onlyconditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players aresufficiently patient, given any proposal in the space of possible agreements, there exists asubgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously accepted inperiod zero. Our strategies are pure and have one–period recall, and we do not make use of apublic randomization device. The players’ discount factors are allowed to be heterogeneous.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht|
Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007.
"One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities,"
044, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 189-215, January.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009.
"A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine.
- V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004.
"Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP37, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 309-329, 06.
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992.
"Noncooperative models of bargaining,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
- Chen, Bo, 2008. "On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 105-107, July.
- Ehud Lehrer & Ady Pauzner, 1999. "Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 393-412, March.
- Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2009. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1773-1814.
- Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 463-477.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012056. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.