Distance rationalizability of scoring rules
Collective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is "closest" to a concept of "consensus".  introduced "Closeness to Unanimity Procedure" as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance (a.k.a the  distance).  shows that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. [4, 5] generalized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanimity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can be distance-rationalized as "Closeness to Unanimity" procedures under a class of weighted distance functions introduced in . Therefore, the results herein generalizes  and builds a connection between scoring rules and a generalization of the Kemeny distance, i.e. weighted distances.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2013|
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