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An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule

Author

Listed:
  • Burak Can

    (Maastricht University)

  • Mohsen Pourpouneh

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Ton Storcken

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

Despite being a well-studied decision rule, the Slater rule has not been analyzed axiomatically. In this paper, we show that it is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, tournamental, tie-breaking, and gradual. Thereby we provide a characterization of it for the first time. We also show these axioms to be logically independent.

Suggested Citation

  • Burak Can & Mohsen Pourpouneh & Ton Storcken, 2021. "An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 835-853, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01305-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01305-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Burak Can & Mohsen Pourpouneh & Ton Storcken, 2022. "An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 447-467, September.

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