IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Update monotone preference rules


  • Can, Burak
  • Storcken, Ton


Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a new condition: “update monotonicity” for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibility theorems for the choice rules are based on–or related to–monotonicity conditions, this appealing condition is satisfied by several non-trivial preference rules. In fact, in the case of pairwise, Pareto optimal, neutral, and consistent rules, the Kemeny–Young rule is singled out by this condition. In the case of convex valued, Pareto optimal, neutral and replication invariant rules, strong update monotonicity implies that the rule equals the union of preferences which extend all preference pairs unanimously agreed upon by k agents, where k is related to the number of alternatives and agents. In both cases, it therewith provides a characterization of these rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Can, Burak & Storcken, Ton, 2013. "Update monotone preference rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 136-149.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:136-149
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.10.004

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    2. Storcken Ton, 2008. "Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    4. Can, Burak & Storcken, Ton, 2012. "Impossibilities with Kemeny updating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 229-231.
    5. Nick Baigent, 1987. "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 161-169.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
    2. Horan, Sean & Sprumont, Yves, 2016. "Welfare criteria from choice: An axiomatic analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 56-70.
    3. Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2015. "Impossibility theorems are modified and unified," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 849-866, December.
    4. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 377-401, August.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:136-149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.