Anonymous and neutral majority rules
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2
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- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori & Claudia Meo, 2024. "Symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Papers 2404.01404, arXiv.org.
- Lirong Xia, 2022. "Most Equitable Voting Rules," Papers 2205.14838, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2017.
"Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited,"
AMSE Working Papers
1736, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2020. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series 10/2020, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited," Working Papers halshs-01613138, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2022.
"Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 319-347, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Working Papers hal-04251726, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Working Papers 2020-06, CRESE.
- Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2021. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Post-Print hal-04419912, HAL.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2021. "Breaking ties in collective decision-making," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(1), pages 411-457, June.
- Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021.
"Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 97-113, July.
- Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2020. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series 10/2020, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Ali Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Post-Print hal-03341695, HAL.
- Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2016.
"On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 53-61.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2015. "On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence," Papers 1508.05948, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2015.
- Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2016.
"Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 37-49.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2015. "Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences," Papers 1506.06069, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2016.
- Onur Doğan & Ayça Ebru Giritligil, 2022. "Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 469-489, September.
- Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2015.
"Symmetric majority rules,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 73-86.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2014-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Mar 2015.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-05, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Onur Doğan & Ayça Ebru Giritligil, 2015. "Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice:Existence Results on Resoluteness," Working Papers 201501, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
- Lirong Xia, 2024. "Computing Most Equitable Voting Rules," Papers 2410.04179, arXiv.org.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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