Symmetric majority rules
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of reversal symmetric majority rules that are anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting those rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2015|
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- Antonio Quesada, 2013. "The majority rule with a chairman," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 679-691, March.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-05, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
- Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013.
"Anonymous and neutral majority rules,"
Working Papers - Mathematical Economics
2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
- Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
- Powers, R.C., 2010. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 12-14, January.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 10-12.
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