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Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Author

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  • Ozkes, Ali

  • Sanver, M. Remzi

Abstract

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozkes, Ali & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2020. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series 10/2020, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:wiw:wus055:7507
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lirong Xia, 2022. "Most Equitable Voting Rules," Papers 2205.14838, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    3. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    4. Onur Doğan & Ayça Ebru Giritligil, 2022. "Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 469-489, September.
    5. Kivinen, Steven, 2024. "Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    6. Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2024. "Axiomatization of plurality refinements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 285-292, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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