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Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules

Author

Listed:
  • Daniela Bubboloni

    (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze)

  • Michele Gori

    (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze)

Abstract

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence of anonymous, neutral, reversal symmetric majority rules

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-05, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:flo:wpaper:2013-05
    as

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    File URL: http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/flo/workingpapers/storicodimad/2013/dimadwp2013-05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 377-401, August.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    3. Can, Burak & Storcken, Ton, 2013. "Update monotone preference rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 136-149.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2015. "Symmetric majority rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 73-86.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; reversal symmetry; majority; linear order; group theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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