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Anonymous and neutral majority rules

Author

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  • Daniela Bubboloni

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze)

  • Michele Gori

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze)

Abstract

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We determine also general formulas for counting these rules and we explicitly determine their number in some special cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-02, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, revised Oct 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:flo:wpaper:2013-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
    2. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    3. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    4. Can, Burak & Storcken, Ton, 2013. "Update monotone preference rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 136-149.
    5. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 10-12.
    6. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2011. "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 272-273, March.
    7. Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2008. "Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 108-110, July.
    8. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1980. "Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences," MPRA Paper 8006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    10. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    11. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2016. "On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 53-61.
    2. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2015. "Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences," Papers 1506.06069, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2016.
    3. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2015. "Symmetric majority rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 73-86.
    4. Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-43.
    5. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2016. "Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 37-49.
    6. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited," AMSE Working Papers 1736, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
    7. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2013. "Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2013-05, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    8. Onur Doğan & Ayça Ebru Giritligil, 2015. "Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice:Existence Results on Resoluteness," Working Papers 201501, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; majority; linear order; group theory.;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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