Anonymous and neutral majority rules
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We determine also general formulas for counting these rules and we explicitly determine their number in some special cases.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2013|
|Date of revision:||Oct 2013|
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