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Decision by majority and the right to vote

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  • Quesada, Antonio

Abstract

The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple characterization of the majority rule, for the two-alternative case, that relies on the following property: the choice prescribed by the rule to a group I of individuals must be the one that would be prescribed in at least 50% of the strict subgroups that can be formed in I. This property means if some subgroup is denied the right to participate in the collective decision, the most likely event is that the exclusion of the subgroup will have no effect on the decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Decision by majority and the right to vote," MPRA Paper 19400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19400
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19400/1/MPRA_paper_19400.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    2. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
    3. J. Woeginger, Gerhard, 2003. "A new characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 89-94, October.
    4. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social welfare function; majority rule; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives; manipulation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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