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On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

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  • Bonifacio Llamazares

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Abstract

Voting systems between two alternatives have been widely studied in the literature of Social Choice. One of the results given by Fishburn (The theory of social choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973 ) allows us to characterize anonymous, neutral and monotonic voting systems by means of functions satisfying adequate conditions. From among all kinds of functions, the class of affine functions is highly interesting because from them it is possible to obtain the voting systems most used in practice. In this paper we analyze the structure of the set of these functions and we show that this set is convex and its extreme points are the functions that generate the following voting systems: simple majority, absolute majority, unanimous majority and Pareto majority. Moreover, we suggest a simple method for choosing a voting system when two alternatives are under consideration. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:17:y:2013:i:3:p:239-248
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0146-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
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    11. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
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    13. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:146-152 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Patrick Harless, 2015. "Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 97-121, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting systems; Simple majority; Absolute majority ; Unanimous majority; Pareto majority; D71;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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