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Majority Voting and Higher-Order Societies

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  • Adrian Miroiu

    (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA))

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study the applications of social choice functions (scfs) like for example the simple majority rule μ and the consensus rule κ to higher-order societies (i.e., societies that have other societies as members). The focus is on the reducibility property of a scf: its capacity to mimic the behavior of other scfs. It is proved that although κ is not reducible to μ, conversely μ can be reduced to κ. A characterization of the class of scfs reducible to κ is given. Finally, it is proved that some scfs can be extended, in the sense that the application of the scf to a society formed of a large number of members is reducible to iterate applications of that scf to (higher-order) societies formed of only two members.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Miroiu, 2021. "Majority Voting and Higher-Order Societies," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 983-999, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:30:y:2021:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-021-09744-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09744-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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