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Collective choice in Aristotle

Author

Listed:
  • Adrian Miroiu

    (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration)

  • Catalin Partenie

    (National University of Political Studies and Public Administration)

Abstract

In his Politics VI 3, 1318a–b, Aristotle discusses constitutional procedures for achieving justice in a society where its classes have different views on it. He analyzes the case of a society consisting in two groups, the poor and the rich, each holding a specific understanding of justice (democratic or oligarchic). In this paper we give, first, a non-formal summary of this section of Politics. Then we approach it in the framework of social choice theory and argue that a social rule for selecting between alternatives may be extracted from it. As Aristotle argued, this rule is consistent with the views on justice and equality of the supporters of both democracy and oligarchy. Finally, we study its properties, as well as some extensions of it when multiple classes are allowed or more than two alternatives are present.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Miroiu & Catalin Partenie, 2019. "Collective choice in Aristotle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 261-281, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:30:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-019-09279-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09279-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George Tridimas, 2012. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Fine, Kit, 1972. "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1083-1090, November.
    3. Andranik Tangian, 2014. "Mathematical Theory of Democracy," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, edition 127, number 978-3-642-38724-1, December.
    4. George Tridimas, 2017. "Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the evolution of the frequency of decision making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 209-230, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Miroiu, 2021. "Majority Voting and Higher-Order Societies," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 983-999, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Oligarchy; Majority; Weighted majority; Social choice; Aristotle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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