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How democracy was achieved

  • Tridimas, George
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    In ‘Perfecting Parliament’ Roger Congleton applies the rational choice framework to explain two attributes of the democratization of the West from the medieval times to the early twentieth century, first the shift of policy making authority from the king to the parliament and second the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population. This review essay sets out the themes of the book, and relates the book to the democratization of classical Athens and democratization from the last quarter of the 20th century.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 651-658

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:4:p:651-658
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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