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Gerrymander-proof representative democracies

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  • Sebastian Bervoets

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  • Vincent Merlin

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Abstract

This article is devoted to the analysis of electoral systems involving two step procedures. It appears that designers are able to manipulate the result of these type of elections by gerrymandering, except in a very few cases. When imposing an unanimity condition on every jurisdiction's voting rule, it is shown that, for any finite number of candidates, a two step voting rule that is gerrymander-proof necessarily gives every voter the power of overruling the unanimity. A characterization of the set of gerrymander proof rules is provided in the case of two candidates.
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Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Gerrymander-proof representative democracies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:473-488
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April.
    2. Felsenthal, Dan S. & Machover, Moshe, 1999. "Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 25-37, January.
    3. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
    4. Marc Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet, 2004. "The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 227-257, January.
    5. Fine, Kit, 1972. "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1083-1090, November.
    6. Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel, 2007. "Equal representation in two-tier voting systems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 401-420, April.
    7. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    8. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    9. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
    10. Fishburn, Peter C, 1971. "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 273-284, March.
    11. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnádi, 2015. "Axiomatic districting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 31-50, January.
    2. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2016. "On avoiding vote swapping," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(3), pages 495-509, March.
    3. Ilan Nehama, 2013. "Complexity of Optimal Lobbying in Threshold Aggregation," Discussion Paper Series dp642, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. repec:spr:qualqt:v:51:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11135-016-0361-y is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Mihir Bhattacharya, 2016. "Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 839-861, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gerrymandering; Manipulation; Federal voting rules; D71; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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