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Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies

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  • Sebastian Bervoets
  • Vincent Merlin

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdiction?s voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2006. "Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 669.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:669.06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    2. M. L. BALINSKI & H. P. Young, 1982. "Fair Representation in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 361-373, June.
    3. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July.
    4. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2007. "De la manipulation des élections indirectes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(3), pages 767-777.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gerrymandering; manipulation; two-tiers voting systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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