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Axiomatic districting

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  • Puppe, Clemens
  • Tasnádi, Attila

Abstract

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Suggested Citation

  • Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2014. "Axiomatic districting," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2014/01, Corvinus University of Budapest.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/01
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    File URL: https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1464/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2010. "A Measure of Bizarreness," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 27-44, April.
    2. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
    3. Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2007. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1473-1510.
    4. Attila Tasnádi, 2011. "The political districting problem: A survey," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 33(3), pages 543-554, December.
    5. Z. Landau & O. Reid & I. Yershov, 2009. "A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 479-492, March.
    6. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Gerrymander-proof representative democracies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
    7. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Strategic Redistricting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-1641, September.
    8. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
    9. Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.
    10. Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2013. "Measuring legislative boundaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 268-275.
    11. John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 113-144, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Katsuya Kobayashi & Attila Tasnádi, 2019. "Gerrymandering in a hierarchical legislature," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 253-279, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    districting; gerrymandering;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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