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Axiomatic districting

  • Puppe, Clemens
  • Tasnádi, Attila

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

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Paper provided by Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 24.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:24
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.wiwi.kit.edu/

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  1. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471, November.
  2. Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2007. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1473-1510, November.
  3. Attila Tasnádi, 2011. "The political districting problem: A survey," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 33(3), pages 543-554, December.
  4. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Consistent representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 348-363, March.
  5. Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2010. "A Measure of Bizarreness," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 27-44, April.
  6. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Strategic Redistricting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-41, September.
  7. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Gerrymander-proof representative democracies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
  8. Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2013. "Measuring legislative boundaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 268-275.
  9. Chambers, Christopher P., 2009. "An axiomatic theory of political representation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 375-389, January.
  10. John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 113-44, March.
  11. Z. Landau & O. Reid & I. Yershov, 2009. "A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 479-492, March.
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