In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.wiwi.kit.edu/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chambers, Christoper P., 2005.
"An axiomatic theory of political representation,"
1218, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012.
"Gerrymander-proof representative democracies,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
- Tim Besley & Ian Preston, 2007.
"Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence,"
IFS Working Papers
W07/06, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2007. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1473-1510.
- Tim Besley & Ian Preston, 2006. "Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence," IFS Working Papers W06/03, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Timothy Besley & Ian Preston, 2006. "Electoral Bias and Policy Choice:Theory and Evidence," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 17, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2007.
"Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1409-1471.
- Coate, Stephen & Knight, Brian, 2007. "Socially Optimal Districting: A Theoretical and Empirical Exploration," Working Papers 07-06, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Chambers, Christopher P., 2005.
"Consistent Representative Democracy,"
1217, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2013. "Measuring legislative boundaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 268-275.
- Chambers, Christopher P. & Miller, Alan D., 2010.
"A Measure of Bizarreness,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science,
now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 27-44, April.
- John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 113-144, March.
- Attila Tasnádi, 2011. "The political districting problem: A survey," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 33(3), pages 543-554, December.
- Z. Landau & O. Reid & I. Yershov, 2009. "A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 479-492, March.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1616-1641, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.