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Extreme Points of First-Order Stochastic Dominance Intervals: Theory and Applications

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Abstract

We characterize the extreme points of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) intervals and show how these intervals are at the heart of many topics in economics. Using knowledge of these extreme points, we characterize the distributions of posterior quantiles under a given prior, leading to an analogue of a classical result regarding the distribution of posterior means. We apply this analogue to various economic subjects, including the psychology of judgement, political economy, and Bayesian persuasion. In addition, FOSD intervals provide a common structure to security design. We use the extreme points to unify and generalize seminal results in that literature when either adverse selection or moral hazard pertains.

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  • Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2023. "Extreme Points of First-Order Stochastic Dominance Intervals: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2355, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2355
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    2. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2022. "Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences," Papers 2206.09164, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.

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