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Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering

Author

Listed:
  • Hideo Konishi
  • Chen‐Yu Pan

Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. Party leaders have both office‐ and policy‐motivations. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one‐sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideo Konishi & Chen‐Yu Pan, 2020. "Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1183-1212, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:5:p:1183-1212
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12433
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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