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Political Competition in Legislative Elections

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  • KRASA, STEFAN
  • POLBORN, MATTIAS K.

Abstract

We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering.

Suggested Citation

  • Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2018. "Political Competition in Legislative Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 809-825, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:04:p:809-825_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions [“Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures.”]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3154-3206.
    2. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2018. "Who Sent You? Strategic Voting, Transfers and Bailouts in a Federation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Dan Bernhardt & Peter Buisseret & Sinem Hidir, 2020. "The Race to the Base," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(3), pages 922-942, March.
    4. Jan Hk{a}z{l}a & Yan Jin & Elchanan Mossel & Govind Ramnarayan, 2019. "A Geometric Model of Opinion Polarization," Papers 1910.05274, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
    5. Hideo Konishi & Chen‐Yu Pan, 2020. "Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1183-1212, September.
    6. Christina Biedny & Trey Malone & Jayson L. Lusk, 2020. "Exploring Polarization in US Food Policy Opinions," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3), pages 434-454, September.
    7. Peter Buisseret & Carlo Prato, 2020. "Voting behavior under proportional representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(1), pages 96-111, January.
    8. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2020. "Does the Winner Take It All? Redistributive Policies and Political Extremism," Working Papers 1157, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Bierbrauer, Felix & Polborn, Mattias, 2020. "Competitive Gerrymandering and the Popular Vote," CEPR Discussion Papers 15401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Nicolae Stef & Sami Ben Jabeur, 2023. "Elections and Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(2), pages 593-625, February.
    11. Dotti, Valerio, 2019. "Political Parties and Policy Outcomes. Do Parties Block Reforms?," MPRA Paper 100227, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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