IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v37y1999i1p25-37.html

Some searches may not work properly. We apologize for the inconvenience.

   My bibliography  Save this article

Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule

Author

Listed:
  • Felsenthal, Dan S.
  • Machover, Moshe

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Felsenthal, Dan S. & Machover, Moshe, 1999. "Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 25-37, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:25-37
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(98)00011-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fielding, Geoff & Liebeck, Hans, 1975. "Voting Structures and the Square Root Law," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 249-256, April.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    3. Pradeep Dubey & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1979. "Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 99-131, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April.
    2. Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2018. "Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 152-161.
    3. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2010. "Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 221-243, July.
    4. Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2013. "Minimizing the threat of a positive majority deficit in two-tier voting systems with equipopulous units," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 75-94, January.
    5. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Gerrymander-proof representative democracies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 473-488, August.
    6. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
    7. Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2019. "Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 51-95, April.
    8. Ines Lindner, 2012. "Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Voting and collective decision-making," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 161-179, January.
    9. Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2021. "Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 70-111, August.
    10. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Fair Allocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after the Next Enlargement," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 433-449, October.
    11. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    12. Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2014. "Influence Vs. Utility in the Evaluation of Voting Rules: A New Look at the Penrose Formula," TSE Working Papers 14-511, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Kazuya Kikuchi, 2022. "Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations," Papers 2208.05316, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    14. Kirsch, Werner & Toth, Gabor, 2022. "Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 118-137.
    15. N. Maaser, 2017. "Simple vs. Sophisticated Rules for the Allocation of Voting Weights," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-78, April.
    16. Imma Curiel, 2014. "A multifaceted analysis of the electoral system of the Republic of Suriname," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(4), pages 29-49.
    17. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2012. "A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 174-180.
    19. Paul Schure & Francesco Passerelli & David Scoones, 2007. "When the Powerful Drag Their Feet," Department Discussion Papers 0703, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dubey, Pradeep & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2005. "Compound voting and the Banzhaf index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 20-30, April.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    3. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Tedjeugang, Narcisse, 2014. "Power theories for multi-choice organizations and political rules: Rank-order equivalence," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 42-49.
    4. Paul Schure & Amy Verdun, 2008. "Legislative Bargaining in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 459-486, December.
    5. Ori Haimanko, 2019. "Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 755-768, September.
    6. Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2018. "Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 152-161.
    7. Edelman, Paul H., 2004. "Voting power and at-large representation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 219-232, March.
    8. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2009. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
    10. Dennis Leech, 2002. "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, March.
    11. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "The Use Of Coleman'S Power Indices To Inform The Choice Of Voting Rule With Reference To The Imf Governing Body And The Eu Council Of Ministers," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 645, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    12. Ori Haimanko, 2020. "Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 299-320, March.
    13. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00142479, HAL.
      • Agnieszka Rusinowska & Michel Grabisch, 2007. "Influence Indices," Working Papers 0705, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Influence Indices," Post-Print halshs-00142479, HAL.
    14. Bhattacherjee, Sanjay & Sarkar, Palash, 2017. "Correlation and inequality in weighted majority voting games," MPRA Paper 83168, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2010. "A model of influence in a social network," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 69-96, July.
    16. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2006. "On the Coleman indices of voting power," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 171(1), pages 273-289, May.
    17. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 17-41, July.
    18. René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-030/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Giulia Bernardi, 2018. "A New Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Index for Games with Abstention," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 165-177, February.
    20. Crama, Y. & Leruth, L. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2003. "Corporate control concentration measurement and firm performance," Other publications TiSEM 3701bf7b-3df8-4f01-8bdf-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:25-37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.