Control in pyramidal structures
Today, the shareholding structure of companies is sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to find back their actual owners and controllers. In particular, in continental Europe and in Asia, control tunnelling appears frequently through pyramidal structure. After describing the ownership structure through a graph association, this paper analyses the voting game at stake in the race for control. It compares existing methods and algorithms to identify the owners and controllers of a firm in a pyramidal structure without cross-ownership. As a real life example, the case of the Belgian retail company, Colruyt, is used to apply these different methods and compare their results. Furthermore, it shows how the ownership structure allows to the Colruyt family to keep the control of Colruyt even if there are discordances inside the family.
|Date of creation:||May 2007|
|Publication status:||Published by: ULB, DULBEA|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chapelle, Ariane & Szafarz, Ariane, 2005.
"Controlling firms through the majority voting rule,"
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
Elsevier, vol. 355(2), pages 509-529.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Controlling firms through the majority voting rule," DULBEA Working Papers 05-05.RS., ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Controlling firms through the majority voting rule," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/149192, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Controlling firms through the majority voting rule," Working Papers CEB 05-004.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cheung, Yan-Leung & Stouraitis, Aris & Wong, Anita W.S., 2005. "Ownership concentration and executive compensation in closely held firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 511-532, September.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2006. "Control consolidation with a threshold: an algorithm," Working Papers CEB 06-007.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2007. "Control consolidation with a threshold: An algorithm," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/6065, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Brioschi, Francesco & Buzzacchi, Luigi & Colombo, Massimo G., 1989. "Risk capital financing and the separation of ownership and control in business groups," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4-5), pages 747-772, September.
- Randall K. Morck, 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc00-1, April.
- Ariane Chapelle, 2001. "Corporate governance en Belgique: l'effet des pyramides," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9933, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lucian Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 1999. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights," NBER Working Papers 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
- Gambarelli, Gianfranco & Owen, Guillermo, 1994. "Indirect Control of Corporations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(4), pages 287-302.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
- Chung, Kee H. & Kim, Jeong-Kuk, 1999. "Corporate ownership and the value of a vote in an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 35-54, March.
- Flath, David, 1992. "Indirect shareholding within Japan's business groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 223-227, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dul:wpaper:07-08rs. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.