Determinants of Family Ownership: The Choice between Control and Performance
This paper analyzes what determines ownership structure of family firms in Korea. Our analysis shows that control is as important a factor as performance in the determination of whether a family in Korea chooses to own a firm. The controlling family prefers to own shares of de facto holding companies because they provide control over affiliated companies and firms that perform well. The family, however, allows its affiliated companies to own more shares of firms that perform poorly and of firms that do not provide the family with power to control the firm. In addition, controlling families own fewer shares of firms that make bond investments in affiliated companies because bond holding does not provide control. We carry out logit regressions for firms without family ownership and for firms with a positive family ownership. The family chooses not to own shares regardless of a firm's performance if the firm does not provide significant control over affiliated companies. We also show that the family values its control more for closely held firms.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Revision in April 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603|
Web page: http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
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- Bernard S. Black & Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, 2006. "Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 366-413, October.
- McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
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- Coles, Jeffrey L. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Felix Meschke, J., 2012.
"Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 149-168.
- Coles, Jeffrey & Lemmon, Michael & Meschke, Felix, 2007. "Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance: the Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance," MPRA Paper 4374, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Feb 2007.
- Bhattacharya, Utpal & Ravikumar, B, 1997. "From Cronies to Professionals: The Evolution of Family Firms," MPRA Paper 22939, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2004.
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