From Cronies to Professionals: The Evolution of Family Firms
We develop a dynamic model where each generation in a family firm can continue operating its inherited production technology or it could hire a professional to do the same. Though the professional is more qualified, his interests are not aligned with the interests of the family. In the context of an overlapping generations framework, we analyze how this tradeoff affects the evolution of the family firm. We find that family firms initially grow in size by accumulating capital and later professionalize their management after reaching a critical size.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1997|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2004|
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- Burkart, Mike & Panunzi, Fausto & Shleifer, Andrei, 2002.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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